STALE MEASUREMENTPast this project's own 2-release window: the published result was measured with v0.32.0, 9 releases ago. Why, and what unblocks it

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IEC 62443 (series)

IEC 62443

IEC 62443 is the reference series for the security of industrial automation and control systems (IACS). Its security-level and requirement structure gives industrial buyers a familiar frame for a robot policy’s adversarial-robustness evidence.

Series of standards; referenced by industrial-security assessors.Evidence, not certification.
What it is

The framework

  • A multi-part series covering IACS security across asset owners, integrators and product suppliers.
  • It defines Security Levels (SL 1-4) reflecting resistance to increasingly capable adversaries.
  • It is the de-facto expectation for OT/industrial security in many procurement processes.
The hook

Where a red-team result fits

Security levels

IEC 62443 separates SL-T (the level a zone is required to reach, set by the operator’s risk assessment), SL-C (the level a component can reach when correctly configured) and SL-A (the level the deployed system actually reaches). A measured ASR under defined attack channels is an input to assessing SL-A for the policy layer against those channels — not a target, not a capability claim, and not a determination of any SL.

What Provael maps to it

Evidence produced

  • Adversarial-robustness evidence framed against attacker capability (the SL model).
  • A per-channel breakdown mapping to distinct threat vectors.
  • Reproducible artifacts an integrator can fold into a 62443-3-3 system assessment.
Timing

Dates (verified 19 Aug 2026)

Series status
Actively maintained (multi-part)

Not legal advice; verify the live EUR-Lex/ISO text at launch before relying on these dates.

Sources

Primary references

How to read this mapping

What it is - and isn’t

  • adversarial-only - Provael measures adversarial robustness - susceptibility to manipulation - not general accuracy, reliability, or functional safety.
  • evidence-not-certification - The output is evidence you file, not a certificate. Provael is not a notified body, a lab, or a certification scheme.
  • behavioural-not-worst-case - The measured result uses templated, auditable attacks; the search-based families (optimized, universal_patch, gradient_patch) have only met the CPU fixture. Results are a floor on susceptibility - a behavioural lower bound, not a certified worst-case bound.
Evidence, not certification

Running Provael does not make a system compliant or certified - it generates measurements you can put into a conformity or assurance file.

Independent project. Not affiliated with or endorsed by ISO, the EU, NIST, IEC, OWASP, or MITRE. Not legal advice.

Clause references are indicative; a wrong clause citation is worse than a missing one.

Turn this into filed evidence.

Download the redacted sample pack, or book an assessment to get the crosswalk filled in for your policy.

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