The framework
- ISO 10218-1:2025 covers the robot; ISO 10218-2:2025 covers robot systems and integration.
- The 2025 revision introduces cybersecurity requirements alongside the traditional mechanical and functional-safety clauses.
- It is widely referenced by machinery-safety assessors and harmonised standards work in the EU.
- It adds cybersecurity requirements to the extent they apply to industrial robot safety, and names IEC 62443 only in its informative Bibliography - so it does not hand the detail off to that series. Provael publishes its own mapping onto IEC 62443; that mapping is Provael’s, not something ISO 10218 routes to.
Where a red-team result fits
Cybersecurity provisions (standard-level mapping — see note)
Paraphrase, not a quotation: the 2025 revision requires security-relevant threats to safety functions to be considered, including manipulation of the control logic that drives motion. Clause-level citation is deliberately omitted — the standard is paywalled and was restructured in 2025, so a clause number cannot be verified against a public source. Read this mapping against your own copy of the standard text before relying on it.
Evidence produced
- Adversarial-robustness evidence for the policy that drives an industrial robot, in simulation.
- A mapping from each finding to a security-relevant safety concern (e.g. keep-out-zone violation).
- A reproducible, versioned report that an integrator can attach to a 10218-2 system assessment.
Dates (verified 19 Aug 2026)
- Published
- 5 February 2025This is the publication date of ISO 10218-1:2025 and ISO 10218-2:2025 (5 February 2025), not an entry-into-force date.
Not legal advice; verify the live EUR-Lex/ISO text at launch before relying on these dates.
What it is - and isn’t
- adversarial-only - Provael measures adversarial robustness - susceptibility to manipulation - not general accuracy, reliability, or functional safety.
- evidence-not-certification - The output is evidence you file, not a certificate. Provael is not a notified body, a lab, or a certification scheme.
- behavioural-not-worst-case - The measured result uses templated, auditable attacks; the search-based families (optimized, universal_patch, gradient_patch) have only met the CPU fixture. Results are a floor on susceptibility - a behavioural lower bound, not a certified worst-case bound.
Running Provael does not make a system compliant or certified - it generates measurements you can put into a conformity or assurance file.
Independent project. Not affiliated with or endorsed by ISO, the EU, NIST, IEC, OWASP, or MITRE. Not legal advice.
Clause references are indicative; a wrong clause citation is worse than a missing one.
Turn this into filed evidence.
Download the redacted sample pack, or book an assessment to get the crosswalk filled in for your policy.